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JUDICIAL REVIEW IN SELECTIVE SERVICE CASESLESSONS FROM VIETNAM
Francis X. Beytagh*
Prologue and Introduction
On December 15, 1972, the Administrative Conference of the United
States' adopted the following recommendations:
A. Pre-induction Judicial Review
Section 10(b) (3) of the Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C.
App. 460(b) (3) (1970), should be amended to delete the nominal prohibition of judicial review of administrative determinations relating to the
classification and processing of registrants except as a defense to a criminal
prosecution. In lieu thereof the Act should expressly authorize pre-induction
judicial review at the behest of any registrant seeking to challenge his classification through a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief brought in a
federal district court. Elements of and conditions upon such a suit should
include the following:
(1) Reasonable restrictions would be imposed with respect to the timing of the suit. These would be related to the Selective Service System's
procedure for designating registrants likely to be drafted considerably in
advance of their scheduled induction date and would authorize pre-induction suits within a limited period, e.g., 30 days, after physical examinations
had been taken and administrative remedies exhausted. [*]
(2) The mere pendency of a suit would not operate as a stay of induction. If it appeared that a suit could not be finally determined before a
scheduled induction, any request for a stay of induction would be ruled
upon according to the traditional standards governing interlocutory injunctive relief.
(3) A determination on pre-induction judicial review that the registrant's classification was lawful would be conclusive in any subsequent
criminal prosecution.
(4) The President would be empowered to suspend the availability of
pre-induction review during any period of declared war or national emergency.
(5) The ordinary requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies
would not be affected.
B. Referral of Conscientious Objector Claims
The Military Selective Service Act should be amended by the addition
to Section 6(j), 50 U.S.C. App. Sec. 456(j) (1970), of a provision for the
Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
I The Administrative Conference of the United States, a body created by statute in 1966,
is charged to study the "efficiency, adequacy, and fairness of the administrative procedure
used by administrative agencies in carrying out administrative programs, and make recommendations to administrative agencies, collectively or individually, and to the President,
Congress, or the Judicial Conference of the United States, in connection therewith, as it con-

siders appropriate .... " to the end "that private rights may be fully protected and regulatory
activities and other Federal responsibilities may be carried out expeditiously in the public
interest." 5 U.S.C. §§ 571, 574 (1970).
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referral of contested and difficult conscientious objector claims to the appropriate State Director's office for advice. Such referral would be available at
the instance of a local board or an appeal board or upon the request of a
registrant appealing the denial of a conscientious objector claim by his
local board. Consideration of such claims by the State Directors office
should be completed within a specified and limited period (for example, 60
or 90 days) unless exceptional circumstances are presented. The response
by the State Director's office in such cases should take the form of an
advisory opinion or recommendation that would be part of the administrative record to be considered by a reviewing court but would not be binding on the local board or the appeal board.
C. FurtherProcedural Reforms
The Selective Service System is encouraged to amend its procedural
regulations in the following respects:
(1) To allow registrants to be accompanied, represented and advised
by counsel or other authorized representatives at local and appeal board
appearances.
(2) To provide for the preparation of suitable transcripts of local
board and appeal board proceedings involving appearances by registrants. [**]
(3) To provide a permanent staff for the National Appeal Board and
to expand the Board's jurisdiction to include discretionary review of any
registrant's claim regardless of whether the appeal board considering the
case had been unanimous.
[*] The views of the Selective Service System and of the Judicial Conference
should be taken into account in the prescription of the period of the limitation.
[**] Transcripts initially could simply take the form of tape recordings,
form only if necessary for subwhich would be
2 prepared in typewritten
sequent review.
About one month later, on January 27, 1973, the United States signed
peace accords ending our involvement in the Vietnam conflict, the longest and
one of the most divisive wars in our country's history. Almost immediately, it
was announced that involuntary induction of persons into the Armed Forces
would be terminated.
Why did the Administrative Conference adopt recommendations relating
to judicial review in Selective Service cases and dealing with other suggested
procedural reforms at a time when the Vietnam war which occasioned the
unpopular draft was ending? Why should we bother ourselves with such problems any further since, after all, are they not substantially moot? Why publish a
piece on a subject no longer timely? These are all legitimate questions which
deserve, at the very outset of this article, clear and convincing answers.
In the first place, the Administrative Conference gave thorough consideration to the matter of mootness before deciding to go forward with adoption of
these recommendations. The reasons underlying its decision are essentially those
2

ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCS OF THE UNITED STATES, RECoMMENDATION

72-7 (1972).
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delineated below. Moreover, the Conference had precipitated a study of the
subject some 18 months earlier, at a time when the amount of Selective Service
litigation was extremely heavy and neither the war nor the draft showed any

immediate signs of ending. That study produced a report which, in substance,
is reprinted in the following pages, together with the basic recommendations, as
set out previously, which the Conference saw fit to adopt.' But it was not simply
because the Conference had had the matter studied and had some recommendations before it that led it to go forward. Ending of the draft will not result in
dismantling of the Selective Service System. Those in the prime-age group will
still be subject to a lottery system and significant numbers of them will be physically examined and classified as to their eligibility for induction. In other words,
the System intends to maintain its administrative machinery intact and operate
on a more or less standby status, even though induction authority will formally
expire on June 30, 1973. Thus, there is likely to be a not insubstantial amount
of continuing disputation about the correctness of Selective Service classifications.
More fundamentally, however, it seems folly to put our heads in the sand
in regard to a matter such as this simply because the proximate cause of the
difficulty has, at least for a time, been removed. Given the history of the past
few decades and the continuing unsettlement in the world, the likelihood of our
country's returning to a partial draft system in which some but not all will be
involuntarily called to military service is hardly remote. It is of course an old
saw that those who do not learn the lessons of history are destined to repeat the
mistakes of the past. This notion could hardly be more pertinent to the subject
of this article and the Conference's recommendations. During the heat of an
ongoing controversy it is difficult if not impossible to step back and attempt to
perceive where one is erring and what changes should be made. In a time of
relative repose, after the controversy has died down, a thoughtful nation should
reflect upon what experience indicates are the lessons to be learned. If we learn
nothing else from Vietnam, and I surely hope we learn more, we should at least
conclude that the system used for determining who would be selected to serve
involuntarily in the Armed Forces was unfair and capricious and, additionally,
that judicial review of Selective Service cases was unnecessarily burdensome,
generally ineffective, demonstrably inconsistent and, to a large extent, productive
of a great deal of needless injustice. Disrespect for the System and the courts
resulted; the whole matter produced scars in our national psyche that are likely
to take years to entirely heal. Now is the time to learn from that experience and
to make whatever recommendations for changes in approach and procedures
that appear to be warranted. That, in essence, is why the Conference proceeded
and why the piece which follows remains pertinent.

Commencing in 1965 and coincident with the large-scale employment of
American military forces in Southeast Asia, greatly increased numbers of a new
S The contents of this article do not necessarily represent the views of the Administrative
Conference, except as they are stated in the formal recommendation set forth above.
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generation were being called to discharge a compulsory military obligation for
unclear purposes in a remote part of the world. Many members of this generation protested against the policies employed in Vietnam, and sought to demur
from their conscription. Many, perhaps, objected primarily because of selfish
reasons only indirectly related to foreign policy or moral considerations. Nonetheless, object they did, in numbers and ways that placed great strains on both
the Selective Service System and the courts.
Antidraft and antiwar activity should not, it seems in retrospect, have
come unexpectedly, given all the circumstances and a long history of draft resistance in our past.4 Unfortunately, the country's legal institutions were poorly
prepared for the epidemic of draft resistance in the years following 1965. An
archaic and unresponsive classification and induction machinery aggravated the
national discord. In response to draft-card burnings and like manifestations of
resistance, those who so violated the law were declared "delinquent" by the
Selective Service System, and were ordered to report for induction without
further regard for the exemptions and deferments accorded them by the very
statutes they were charged with violating.
It was at this juncture that the courts moved actively into the arena. Starting with the Second Circuit's decision in Wolff V. Selective Service Board5 and
through subsequent Supreme Court decisions, the courts have refused to allow
the Selective Service System to run rampant without the availability of early
and effective judicial review. As the volume of litigation grew apace, three significant problems began to unfold: 1) in view of the vagaries of the administrative
process, and the nature of the legal issues, the courts' ability to do justice in Selective Service cases was rendered questionable; 2) since the majority of the cases
were criminal, and as such warranted docket priority, the disposition of other
federal court cases was delayed; and 3) an already overburdened and delayplagued federal judiciary system was further clogged, perhaps critically. Between
1966 and 1971, criminal cases involving Selective Service law violations increased
from 663 to 4,539. Extrapolation from available statistics as to civil litigation
results in an estimated 400 to 500 such cases brought or pending in 1970; most
of these took the form of suits to enjoin induction and in-service habeas corpus
actions. Thus in a period of only five years, this general category of cases accounted for a rise from a negligible figure to over 5,000 actions in the federal
courts per year.6 Nor has this burden on the courts diminished as the war has
wound down. Draft cases pending increased from 733 on June 30, 1967, to 5,305
on the same date four years later, and to a Justice Department estimate of 8,900
as of July 1972. Any workable scheme that would reduce this burden on the
judiciary would plainly be desirable, and possible avenues of approach in assuag4 Draft resistance is no new phenomenon, as our experience in the Civil War '(e.g., the
Gotham Riots, which resulted in violence and over 100 deaths) and World War I, and to a
lesser extent in World War II, indicates.
5 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967).
6 Data as to criminal prosecutions is obtained from the Detailed Statistical Tables appended to the Annual Reports of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts for the years 1967-71. Data as to civil litigation is more difficult to obtain and

is extrapolated from available statistics, as indicated in the text, coupled with a survey of these
kinds of cases culled from the Selective Service Law Reporter and other sources.
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ing its effects warrant exploration for both the immediate and long-term future.
Any consideration of judicial review of administrative actions must of necessity focus on the whether, the when, and the how. A failure to separate questions
of standard, reviewability, ripeness (or timing), and method (or mode) has
caused considerable confusion in the Selective Service context. It is unlikely that
Congress could do much if anything about narrowing the standard of judicial
review without eliminating judicial review entirely. In Selective Service cases,
the "basis in fact" test is the applicable one' - only if there is no basis in fact
for the registrant's classification should a court interfere. That standard, with
some justification, has been called the narrowest known to the law. When and
how a court should act is tied, in the Selective Service context, to questions of
reviewability, although that is not necessarily the case in all administrative situations. Some factual determinations may (or should) be essentially unreviewable
by the courts, but unreviewability always raises serious due process problems.
The fact that this issue is submerged in more prosaic considerations in the Selective Service area, however, may create some important difficulties for registrants.
Moreover, the timing and the method of judicial review are inextricably interrelated in Selective Service cases. Whether review should be prior to or after
ordered induction is, in most cases, tantamount to whether it will occur in civil or
in criminal proceedings, and may also bear importantly on its effectiveness.
In revamping the system for judicial review Congress has a variety of
options to which it might turn - a specialized court for Selective Service cases'
and direct review of classification by the courts of appeals9 have been proposed.
For reasons which appear in the following pages, however, it is my opinion that
the soundest approach is to allow across-the-board preinduction review in the
district courts. Any form that judicial review might take, however, is dependent
initially on substantial procedural reform within the Selective Service System
itself, a development on which a good start has been made' but on which much
still remains to be done."
I. Considerations Relating to the Adequacy of Current Review Procedures
Section 10(b) (3) of the Selective Service law was amended in 1967, as a
legislative response to the Wolff decision. It reads in pertinent part:
No judicial review shall be made of the classification or processing of
any registrant by local boards, appeal boards, or the President, except as
a defense to a criminal prosecution instituted under section 12 of this title,
7 Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
8 Such a court would have exclusive jurisdiction over all Selective Service cases, with
review of its decisions by the Supreme Court on certiorari, like the Emergency Court of Appeals
created to deal with wage and price control disputes during World War I.
9 Under such a system, the courts of appeals would have exclusive review authority over
Selective Service cases, as in the deportation case situation (see 8 U.S.C. § 1105a), with
preinduction review the norm rather than the exception.
10 See pp. 1184-91 infra.
11 The Selective Service System, under the leadership of Director Curtis W. Tarr,
abandoned any efforts at punitive reclassification and has sought to bring more uniformity
into the System's processes by promulgating policy directives on important matters, such as
implementation of recent Supreme Court decisions involving nonreligious conscientious objection; see pp. 1197-99 infrz.
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after the registrant has responded either affirmatively or negatively to an
order to report for induction, or for civilian work in the case of a registrant
determined to be opposed to participation in war in any form. Provided,
that such review shall go to the question of the jurisdiction herein reserved
to local boards, appeal boards, and the President only when
there is no basis
12
in fact for the classification assigned to such registrant.
In Wolff, the Second Circuit found that two local draft boards acted without jurisdiction in reclassifying to I-A status students who had been engaged in
antiwar protest activity. The statutory amendment sought to eliminate all
preinduction judicial review in Selective Service cases. The Supreme Court's
3
first brush with the problem came in Oestereich v. Selective Service Board."
There a registrant exempt from the draft as a divinity student pursued a preinduction challenge to his reclassification to I-A. As in Wolff the reclassification
was based on alleged delinquency in returning his draft card to the Government.
With the Solicitor General confessing error on the use of the delinquency procedure to reclassify because of "activities unrelated to the merits of granting or
continuing [the prior] exemption,"' 4 the Supreme Court evaded the thorny
constitutional issues presented in finding the conduct of the reclassifying board
"basically lawless." Despite the rather clear expression of congressional intent in
amended section 10(b) (3), the Court expressly sanctioned resort to preinduction
judicial review, at least in certain cases. That exception was applied and further
extended in two subsequent cases-Guknecht v. United States 5 and Breen u.
Selective Service Board."
Clark v. Gabriel," however, which was decided along with Oestereich,
significantly limits the availability of review prior to induction. In pertinent
part, the Court there said:
In Oestereich the delinquency procedure by which the registrant was
reclassified was without statutory basis and in conflict with petitioner's rights
explicitly established by the statute and not dependent upon an act of judgment by the Board. Oestereich, as a divinity student, was by statute unconditionally entitled to exemption. Here [in Gabrie, by contrast, there is
no doubt of the Board's statutory authority to take action which appellee
challenges, and that action inescapably involves a determination of fact and
an exercise of judgment. .

.

. To allow pre-induction judicial review of

such determinations would be to permit precisely the kind of "litigious
interruption of procedures to provide necessary military manpower"
which Congress sought to prevent when it enacted Sec. 10(b) (3).18
A recent decision confirms the Gabriel limitation of Oestereich, a distinction implicitly accepted in several Supreme Court cases decided in the interim. 9 In
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
by the

50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (1970).
393 U.S. 233 (1968).
Id. at 237.
396 U.S. 295 (1970).
396 U.S. 460 (1970).
393 U.S. 256 (1968).
Id. at 258.
Fein v. Selective Service Board, 405 U.S. 365 (1972). Those decisions shaped in part
distinction are: McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969) ; Mulloy v. United States,
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sum, while carving out an exception to section 10(b) (3)'s preclusion of preinduction review for a limited category of cases, the Court at the same time approved of the statute's application to a significant number of Selective Service
cases, even where an illegally punitive reclassification was involved.
A. Section 10(b) (3) and Criminal Prosecution for Failure to Be Inducted
Leaving the matter of assessing the validity of challenges to a Selective Service classification in the main to criminal prosecutions - as Clark v. Gabriel
does - presents serious problems for registrants in terms of fairness and justice.
A criminal case is a crude and ineffective device for this purpose for a number
of reasons. For one thing, some courts have simply refused to convict violators
of the draft laws and some have done no more than give suspended sentences
for such violations, no doubt reflecting the judges' personal biases about the
Vietnam conflict and the draft system. Conversely, other courts have applied
the criminal process with a vengeance in this area and have meted out the maximum possible penalties. The effect of this is not simply a lack of uniformity in
application of the laws depending on the part of the country, the judge who
handles a particular registrant's trial, etc. Many feel that what happened in the
late 1960's was to a significant extent a perversion and prostitution of the criminal justice system in this country because of an ideological chasm about the Vietnam situation. These developments disserved the System and the country in
general and provide a strong argument for preinduction judicial review. Preinduction review would not eliminate all criminal cases, for some who lost in their
civil suit would undoubtedly still choose not to submit to induction. But the
current use of criminal process fails to clarify the substantive rights of registrants
at a sufficiently early point in time. In many situations registrants are forced to
commit a crime in order to challenge their classification. A great nation can and
should remedy such an inconsistency.
Another aspect of utilizing the criminal process borders on the farcical:
bluntly stated, the laws do not lend themselves to effective enforcement through
the criminal process, at least given the existing administrative arrangement. For
example, in fiscal year 1970 some 30,000 reported violations of the Selective
Service laws resulted in only some 3,800 criminal prosecutions, mainly as the
result of procedural errors by System officials and also in part because of prosecutorial discretion. Surely such selective and inefficient enforcement is rife with
inequities. Additionally, in light of Oestereich, an alternative to the criminal
prosecution route is available to a degree - where violation of the statute by
the System is clear-cut and, ironically, where it is least needed to protect a registrant's fundamental rights. But, in view of Clark v. Gabriel'supholding of section 10(b) (3), such an alternative is not available in that whole array of difficult
and ambiguous situations where administrative fact-finding has taken place.
The result is that those registrants most in doubt about the validity of their claims
and their status generally are forced to guess about this matter without the bene398 U.S. 410 (1970); Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99 (1971); and McGee v. United
States, 402 U.S. 479 (1971).
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fit of a preinduction clarification by the judiciary, while those who could more
confidently refuse to report for induction and then be vindicated in a criminal
proceeding are allowed preinduction review. As Mr. Justice Stewart has pointed
out, the effects of the Court's reading of 10(b) (3) are, to say the least, curious."
From a fairness standpoint, the inconsistency in approach as to preinduction
review resulting from the Supreme Court decisions provides still more urgent
reasons for adopting a general alternative to induction under threat of prosecution. Over a four-month period in 1971, less than 10 per cent of all Selective
Service cases were brought into the courts through the preinduction review route;
about 25 per cent of the cases found their way to the courts through the medium
of habeas corpus actions; the remaining cases (with a few exceptions) were
criminal prosecutions for refusing induction. Overall, the Department of Justice
estimates that approximately 700 preinduction cases were filed during the
period from June 1967 to October 1970, and relief was granted in about 180 of
them. Thus, while the chink in the armor of section 10(b) (3) is not monumental, neither is it inconsequential. It is simply an anomaly that the criminal
process need not be endured when the board's action can be shown to be clearly
illegal but not so if the situation is otherwise. The availability of preinduction
review according to these criteria is cold comfort to all but the most demonstrably
wronged registrants.21
Moreover, under the present system of defense to a criminal prosecution,
postinduction habeas corpus, and limited preinduction review, justice may well
be denied to poorly informed registrants who are unaware that they have justifiable and possibly meritorious cases. Accurate legal information about the Selective Service System, despite considerable recent efforts on its part and development of the Selectiue Serznlce Law Reporter, has not been readily available to
many registrants, especially those of lower socioeconomic classes and those living
in rural areas.22 It is more difficult to evaluate the merits of a registrant's case
under the present system of judicial review than if preinduction review were
generally available, in view of the timing, knowledge of the cases available to the
court, and like factors, although this should be ameliorated to a considerable extent by the boards' following new procedural requirements adopted in 1971.
Some of the Selective Service regulations are quite technical and, despite the
specialization of a few lawyers in major cities, a substantial Selective Service law
bar has not developed, presenting problems in finding competent legal advice in
some situations. While this problem would remain to a considerable extent were
preinduction review made generally available, the opportunity to obtain an early
determination by a court would assist registrants significantly.
More fundamentally, common sense and elementary notions of justice
20 See Oesterich v. Selective Service Board, 393 U.S. 233, 245-52 (1968) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
21 In its 1971 amendments to the Military Selective Service Act, Congress refrained from
disturbing the Oestereich-Gabrieldelineation. One wonders whether this signifies, on the one
hand, concern for how any further attempts to restrict reviewability would be dealt with by
the courts, or whether Congress' failure to react is an indication of satisfaction that preinductlion review would be available only where substantially irrelevant because of procedural
reform at the agency level.
22 See Donahue, The Supreme Court vs. Section 10(b)(3) of the Selective Service Act:
A Study in Ducking ConstitutionalIssues, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 908, 957 (1970).
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indicate that Selective Service registrants should be spared having either to subject themselves to criminal prosecution with the stigma attached thereto or,
alternatively, submit to induction and then seek habeas corpus relief, in order to
obtain judicial review." In no other significant area of the law is a person
required to commit a crime or recant an oath in order to obtain judicial review
of his claim against a government agency. To quote one observer, "It is corrupting. For those who cannot claim religious objection ... [successfully], only
dishonesty pays. Claim to be a homosexual: be one. Claim to be an addict:
be one. Claim to be psychotic: become. For in the process pretense can become
reality."2 4 Surely no such requirement is imposed in the administrative context
generally. For example, contrast the handling of economic interests allegedly aggrieved by agency decisions:
Where the legal issue presented is fit for judicial resolution, and where a
regulation requires an immediate and significant change in the plaintiffs'
conduct of their affairs with serious penalties attached to noncompliance,
access to the courts under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act must be permitted, absent a statutory bar or some
other unusual circumstance, neither of which appears here.25
Statutory bars undoubtedly exist in the Selective Service context, but in the light
of what will be said later, it becomes increasingly difficult to find those "unusual
circumstances" which justify a continuation of the present approach to draft
law enforcement. What is good enough for Abbott Laboratories, or any of the
multitude of corporations affected by administrative action, should a fortiori
be good enough for and accorded to those involuntarily required to serve, fight
and possibly die in our nation's Armed Forces.
As has been pointed out, there is, even within the present framework, a
great lack of uniformity in the application of the law to registrants. Unfairness is bred as well by irreconcilable and ambiguous court decisions as by arbitrary local board actions, and it engenders cynicism and disrespect for the entire
system. And something should be said about the fact that draft proceedings may
well be the first time that large numbers of the young citizens of this country come
into significant contact with an arm of "their" government. This country's
recent Nobel laureate, Kenneth Arrow, has written:
Like compulsory chapel or church attendance, which is its closest equivalent,
the draft has a further disadvantage in that while it may at best produce a
grudging and hostile acquiescence in the methods of the society, it frequently
closes the mind to any alternative or to any reorganization of information.
The psychological strains which are produced by compulsory service of any
kind naturally result in displaced aggressions rather than in any reform of
the system which created them. Consequently the draft by the kind of
23 As discussed subsequently (infra, pp. 1173-76), judicial review through postinduction
habeas corpus is rife with problems as well. An individual pursuing such a route must change
status from civilian to military, possibly compromise conscience, perhaps never attain a fair
judicial determination, and, in either expedient, possibly suffer reprisals from what might be
unnecessarily harsh official reaction during the prejudgment period.
(1970).

24

W.

25

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 153 (1967).

GAYLIN, IN
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indoctrination and hidden frustrations which it produces may be an important factor in preventing that reevaluation of the national policy and
the national image which is so essential in the modem world if the national
state itself is to survive. The draft therefore is likely to be an enemy of the
survival of the very state in the interests of which it is supposedly involved. 2
We must ask ourselves if this might not have been the case in the Vietnam-era
draft. And we must ask what can and should be done to revise the system so
that this will not happen again. Review in criminal cases is surely not the answer.
B. Petitions by In-Service Personnel
The habeas corpus proceeding has become an accepted method for inservice complainants to challenge their classification and involuntary induction,
and can of course be brought immediately upon being drafted. It has nevertheless
proved to be insufficient in many respects. In evaluating the adequacy of habeas
corpus in this context, it is at the outset important to note what section 10(b) (3)
does not say and what the court has not held about it. That provision makes no
reference whatever to the availability of habeas corpus proceedings as a means of
testing the validity of a Selective Service classification. In appearing to limit any
such contention to presentment as a defense in criminal actions, the statutory language nonetheless speaks of the registrants "affirmative or negative" response to
an induction order. Since a criminal prosecution would obviously not lie where a
registrant had responded affirmatively, Congress must have had habeas corpus
proceedings implicitly in mind when it enacted section 10(b) (3), despite the
absence of any other statutory language in that regard. Moreover, as the Supreme Court has on several occasions noted, and the Government has consistently conceded, in view of the constitutional prohibition on suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus Congress should not be regarded as having attempted to
do so in enacting section 10(b) (3). Indeed, the legislative history of the statute
indicates recognition of the traditional view that those in military service are
sufficiently restrained of their liberty so that habeas is available." However,
availability and effectiveness are two very different matters.
Courts have traditionally adopted a laissez-faire attitude when "interference" with military procedures has been at issue, and thus have granted relief
to an in-service complainant only infrequently. Perhaps the major reason for
the indifference of the courts was the highly emotional aura which clouded
matters relating to the national defense. At one point in time there was a widely
held viewpoint that if the courts began to overturn decisions of the Selective
Service System, the snags in the draft machinery and the resulting effect on our
military manpower would leave the country defenseless. During the 1960's,
however, some courts seemed to become disenchanted with arguments such as
this and liberalized decisions began to appear, at least occasionally. But the
26 Boulding, The Impact of the Draft on the Legitimacy of the National State, in TAE
195-96 (S.Tax ed. 1967).
27 Oestereich v. Selective Service Board, 393 U.S. 233, 248 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Justices Brennan and White joined in Stewart's dissent. See, e.g., Eagles v. United States
ex rel. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304 (1946).
DRAFT 191,
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trend was not a universal or uniform one, and the resultant patchwork further
complicated judicial predictability in an already overly complex area.
One trouble spot in the habeas corpus proceeding which has produced a
fair amount of litigation is the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine.
A principle of comity rather than a limitation on federal jurisdictional power,
this doctrine establishes a requirement that all administrative remedies be
exhausted before review by a federal court will be allowed. The weight of authority, though, holds that those remedies do not have to be exhausted if irreparable harm will result."
In the in-service habeas corpus context, one specific problem with this "exhaustion" or "delayed jurisdiction" concept has been with the appeal to the
Board for the Correction of Military Records (for whatever branch of the service
in which the petitioner serves). Most courts have held that this is not an administrative remedy which must be exhausted before habeas will lie." However, the
Ninth Circuit-which for obvious reasons was the most important court of
appeals during the Vietnam conflict-held in Craycroft v. Ferrall'0 that for the
claimant to get his day in court he must first appeal to the Board for the Correction of Military Records. The Craycroft decision was subsequently vacated without opinion by the Supreme Court, "1 since between the time the case was decided
by the Ninth Circuit and the time it found its way to the Supreme Court, the
Department of Justice filed a memorandum which clearly indicated its position
that administrative remedies had been sufficiently exhausted for purposes of
filing a habeas corpus petition without resort to those service boards.
The action taken by the Department of Justice regarding Craycroft, as
well as that of the Supreme Court, apparently prompted the Ninth Circuit itself
to modify its earlier stance. "2 This has not entirely cleared the air, though, because prior decisions of a court of appeals can only be overturned by the court
sitting en banc. Several problems thus still remain in regard to the exhaustion
notion: (1) ambiguities may still arise from the Ninth Circuit's not having
expressly overruled Craycroft; (2) the Department of Justice could alter its
former position with the influx of new personnel and administration; (3) the
individual, in exhausting his in-service remedies, may serve out his military
obligation before he obtains judicial review of an unfavorable decision rendered
by his board. "
A second obstacle to the smooth working of habeas corpus proceedings is
28 See K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT §
TROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 424, 426 '(1965).

20.01 (1959); L.

JAFFE, JUDICIAL CON-

29 See, e.g., Patterson v. Stancliff, 330 F. Supp. 110 (D. Vt. 1971); Bouthillette v.
Commanding Officer, 318 F. Supp. 1143 (D. R.I. 1970).
30 408 F. 2d 587 (9th Cir. 1969).
31 Craycroft v. Ferrall, 397 U.S. 335 (1970).
32 See Bratcher v. McNamara, 448 F.2d 222, 224 (9th Cir. 1971).
33 See Hansen, Judicial Review of In-Service Conscientious Objector Claims, 17 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 975, 983 (1970). On the whole problem of exhaustion in the Selective Service
context, albeit at the preinduction stage, compare the Supreme Court's decisions in McKart
v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969), allowing claims to be asserted in defense to a criminal
prosecution despite the failure to exhaust all administrative remedies, with McGee v. United
States, 402 U.S. 479 (1971), taking a contrary approach and applying the exhaustion concept
in a similar context where, unlike in McKart, pursuit of administrative appeals did not appear
fruitless and the registrant had deliberately sought to bypass them.

[Vol. 48:1164]

JUDICIAL REVIEW IN SELECTIVE SERVICE CASES

1175

found in the jurisdictional requirement that federal courts grant the writ of
habeas corpus "within their respective jurisdictions."3 What happens frequently
is that a claimant will be serving his military obligation far from his home base
and commanding officer. This can effectively eliminate any chance of his obtaining judicial review because no proper defendant (such as a commanding officer)
resides within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
In Schlanger v. Seamans" the petitioner was in Operation Bootstrap, at
Arizona University, but his home base and commanding officer were in Georgia.
He sought habeas corpus in Arizona, naming the Secretary of the Air Force, the
Georgia Commanding Officer and the AF ROTC Commanding Officer at
Arizona State as defendants. His petition was denied, even though the majority
found indications of custody adequate for habeas corpus jurisdiction, because
none of the proper defendants were residents of Arizona. The district court,
therefore, had no power to entertain a habeas corpus petition in such circumstances; jurisdiction would attach, presumably, only in Georgia.
The effect of the holding in Schlanger was reduced, but to an uncertain
degree, by the subsequent decision in Straifi v. Laird" In that case, the Court
cut through the fiction of an alleged jurisdictional defect in holding that a California district court had power to hear a habeas corpus application filed by an
Army reservist on inactive duty who was domiciled there despite the fact that
the individual was under the nominal command of an officer located in Indiana.
In distinguishing Schlanger the Court pointed out that the individual's application for a conscientious objector discharge had been in fact processed by military
authorities in California. Thus, the Court concluded, "Strait's commanding
officer is 'present' in California through the officers in the hierarchy of the command who processed this serviceman's application for discharge."'"
The uncertain breadth of the Strait holding becomes apparent when a
serviceman is ordered to report to another base. Is the petitioner still considered
to be in custody within the jurisdiction where the habeas corpus action is pending? If there has been no demonstrable administrative action taken on a serviceman's application for discharge, will the serviceman's petition be governed by
Schlangeror Strait? Even if there has been no transfer, it is not uncommon for the
habeas proceeding to last six months. Such an eventuality restricts the usefulness
of the petitioner to the military, and creates just the sort of judicial interference
with military affairs which Congress has assiduously sought to avoid. Thus, the
jurisdictional problems pertaining to habeas corpus create uncertainty and extreme inconvenience for all parties interested in Selective Service law enforcement.
Beyond the exhaustion and jurisdictional problems which inhere in habeas
corpus proceedings, their inadequacy stems from other factors as well. Habeas
corpus is no remedy at all for genuine conscientious objectors. The acceptance
of induction is squarely in opposition to the grounds on which the truly sincere
C.O. bases his beliefs; such an individual will refuse induction and accept conviction and possible imprisonment rather than submit himself to even the most
34
35

28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (1970).
401 U.S. 487 (1971).

36 406 U.S. 341 (1972).
37 Id., at 345.
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limited military supervision and training. In this regard, we need only recall the
sad experiences of members of one particular religious sect under the Vietnam
draft-a significant percentage of those actually imprisoned for refusal to be
inducted in the 1960's were Jehovah's Witnesses."8 Additionally, given the extraordinary character of the habeas remedy, if a registrant refuses to submit to induction at least he is certain he will have his day in court; however, if he subnits and pursues his habeas remedy, he cannot be sure of ever obtaining a
forum. 9 Moreover, the courts are limited in their review of classifications to
examination of the administrative record. From this the court must ascertain
whether or not there is any basis in fact for the classification. A federal court
may not be any more qualified than Selective Service boards to make some of
the determinations which go to the merits of an exemption or deferment claim.
But one must consider the innate fairness of the procedures which provide the
information to which the court is restricted in applying such a narrow standard
of review. In many cases the habeas court simply will not have effective access
to the bases of these administrative determinations."
Finally, one cannot minimize the drastic change in life style which resort
to the habeas remedy forces on an individual. He must, in effect, accept a temporary shift from civilian to military life in order to challenge his classification, with
the inconvenience and possible deception that this necessarily involves. Petitioning
for habeas corpus, in this context, also involves the effective recantation of an oath
taken at the time of induction. This fact alone should make the habeas approach
reprehensible in the eyes of the law. In addition, "[t]here is little assurance,
moreover, that the military will treat [petitioner's] efforts to obtain the writ with
sympathetic understanding," as Justice Murphy noted in Estep v. United States.41
For all of these reasons,42 reliance upon the habeas remedy can produce immeasurable psychological effects on both the petitioner and the society which has
made him. In short, in many situations it is either ineffective or unjust; in some
circumstances it suffers from both of these defects."
38 W. GAYLIN, supra note 24, at 269-71.
39 Note, Pre-induction Judicial Review, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 948, 959 (1969).
40 As indicated previously, habeas corpus ordinarily lies where the registrant is stationed,
while his records are likely to be stored at his local board. Given the nature of military life,
these two locations are prone to being quite far apart, complicating the court's problem of
fairly assessing his claim. Many courts exhibit a rather negative attitude toward such suits
in any event; the individual is in the service and has already changed his status in this respect.
Maintaining the status quo, it might appear to a court, is achieved by leaving the individual
in his present situation-whatever the circumstances of his getting there.
41 327 U.S. 114, 130 (1946) (concurring opinion).
42 Additional complicating factors include potential mootness as well as the cost, complexity and delay that habeas actions involve. An individual might simply not be able to
afford litigation on a private's pay. The complexity of the case may make finding effective
legal representation at a strange and new location difficult if not impossible, and the habeas
proceedings '(together with any attendant appeals) may occupy most if not all of the time the
individual is required to serve. Moreover, during his time in the military his life is likely to be
unpleasant, for he is the "oddball" or "troublemaker"; he will probably engender animosity
among his superiors and find little understanding, if not hostility, from his peers. His existence
is likely to be a lonely one and his tasks menial and demeaning; the psychological pressures
to conform would be great. Figures on the number of in-service suits not brought, or initiated
and then dropped, are not available. The numbers are likely to be significant; in short, there
are strong practical considerations at work to deter the bringing and pursuing of habeas
actions in the Selective Service context.
43 Resort to mandamus, as an alternative form of relief, while attempted with increasing
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Il. Pros and Cons of Preinduction Judicial Review in All Selective Service Cases
Few would seriously maintain that the Selective Service System seeks to intentionally deprive registrants of essential procedural protections when they attempt to challenge their classifications administratively and in the courts. Yet it is
nonetheless true that the System has traditionally taken a niggardly approach to
the matter of review of classification determinations."' Indeed, it is fair to say that
individuals affected by System decisions have been accorded the least amount of
procedural protections, both in regard to administrative handling45 and judicial
review, of any persons subject to the authority of a major administrative agency.
The justifications for such a "stingy" approach with respect to administrative
processing and judicial review are generally grounded on the System's contention that the conscription process must be free from delay and interruption if it
is to serve the country effectively. Indeed, this was the major rationale behind
the congressional proscription on preinduction judicial review in the 1967 amendment of section 10(b) (3)." This rationale, then, appears to present the strongest
reason for continuing a system under which preinduction judicial review is generally unavailable and a registrant seeking to contest his classification must do so
either through defending a criminal prosecution for failure to report for induction
or by bringing a habeas corpus (or similar proceeding) after grudgingly submitting to induction.
Concern about litigious interruptions of the conscription process might well
have considerable substance in an all-out war situation where virtually every ablebodied younger male was required to serve his country in the Armed Forces. It
has significantly less plausibility in a limited-war context such as we have been
involved in for the past decade or so. As a matter of fact, the Marshall Commission specifically recognized this important factor in entitling its report "In
Pursuit of Equity: Who Serves When Not All Serve?" Simply stated, we can
afford more due process when demands of national security are less pressing;
given all the circumstances, we should extend procedural protections to individuals affected by Selective Service System determinations to the maximum
extent possible consistent with the national interest in a ready supply of manpower for military service. In deference to the concerns about the effects that
the availability of preinduction judicial review might have in an all-out war situation, it would probably be wise to provide, should such legislation be adopted,
that entitlement to such judicial review could be suspended upon declaration of
frequency, has enjoyed very little success in Selective Service cases. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy which is utilized only in the most urgent cases. See, e.g., Ex parte Collett,
337 U.S. 55, 72 (1949). The issuance of a mandamus decree is left to the discretion of the
court. See CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962). More importantly, if
there exists another remedy, mandamus will not lie. See Carter v. Seamans, 411 F.2d 767,
773 (5th Cir. 1969). Though its jurisdictional requirements are complex and inconvenient,
habeas corpus generally exists as an alternative form of relief, thus destroying the grounds for
mandamus. See, e.g., Strait v. Laird, 445 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1971).
44 Note, Due Process in Selective Service Appeals, 39 U. Cnr. L. Rzv. 331, 344-52 (1972).
45 Some significant improvements in procedural protection incident to the administrative
process were achieved, however, under provisions of the 1971 amendments to the Act. See
pp 1184-91 infra.
46 See 113 CoNG. REc. 15426 (1967) (remarks of Senator Russell).
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a national emergency by the President so long as Congress did not disagree with
a stated period of time, say 30 days." In this manner a mechanism would be
provided to avoid any practical problems that a system of freely available preinduction judicial review might be thought to have in a total conscription kind
of situation.
There is a more fundamental difficulty with the rationale offered to support
the preclusion of preinduction judicial review. Contrary to the implicit assumption of Congress, the System and apparently the Executive branch, there are delays and interruptions necessarily and very much present in the process as it presently is functioning. One who refuses to report for induction and is subjected to
criminal prosecution is not available for military service and someone else, who
might not otherwise be called, must go-in his place. It is true, of course, that
some of those who refuse to report might do likewise if they were given preinduction judicial review and had their claims rejected. Nonetheless, it seems
likely that, after unsuccessful resort to freely available preinduction review, many
registrants who had had their day in court would then agree to submit to induction instead of face an ensuing criminal prosecution. And surely the present
system cannot be justified on the ground that many who have meritorious claims
for exemption or deferment are effectively coerced into waiving them because of
the limited procedural alternatives available to them. Such a justification would
condone a system that is unjust and unfair, since some who should not under
the law be required to serve in fact end up doing so. Moreover, and importantly,
the greatest hardship in this regard is understandably inflicted on the least
affluent and poorly educated, while the rich and the knowledgeable pursue whatever remedial paths are available to them.
The alternative of submitting to induction and immediately challenging
one's classification in a habeas corpus proceeding has a similar potential for delay
and interruption of the functioning of the conscription process. Indeed, it may be
even more insidious in this regard, for the Armed Forces at least know that an
individual who refuses to report will be unavailable for military service. One
who submits to induction and then proceeds to litigate the question whether he
should be in the military is generally of little use to the Armed Forces. Most
courts will act to preserve the status quo pending determination of the validity
of the claim; the individual usually cannot be freely transferred to another base
or overseas; he is less available for military duties than for processing his habeas
case and the preliminary administrative steps related thereto. In short, resort to
habeas proceedings by substantial numbers of inductees presents significant
problems not only for the individuals involved, as indicated previously, but is
hardly a panacea for the Armed Forces. And, assuming that some of the habeas
cases eventually result in the judicial upholding of the inductee's claim, the
result is that he must be released from the military after having served for a
period in which he is likely to have contributed little if anything. Thus, from a
pragmatic point of view the present system does not avoid delay and interruption,
as is commonly suggested. Rather, it contributes to delay and interruption as
47 See AmIINISTRA.TIVE CONFERENCE
A(4) (1972), supra at 1164.
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much if not more than a carefully worked out and administered system allowing
for readily available preinduction judicial review.
All things considered, then, a number of reasons argue for preinduction judicial review being made freely available to all registrants, despite the various arguments that have been made against such an approach. Actions of the Selective
Service System in classifying men and in rejecting their claims have important
and lasting effects on individual lives. Yet we have consistently taken a niggardly
and narrow approach toward both administrative consideration and judicial
review. Such an approach might have been justified by the circumstances in
which it arose-an all-out wartime situation in which every able-bodied young
man was needed for military service and the administrative load on the System
was phenomenal-and might again be necessary in such circumstances. Special
provision should probably be made for suspension of the more elaborate and timeconsuming procedures suggested here if such a situation should recur. But in the
cold war and limited conflict kinds of situations such as we have been experiencing during the past several decades, an approach that allows for more careful administrative scrutiny and for earlier judicial review seems not only workable but
warranted, particularly when comparison is made with the approaches taken
in other administrative fields. Prior to 1971, a person was accorded fewer procedural rights in the Selective Service field than in any other administrative
context. And in no other significant area is a person required to commit a crime
in order to obtain judicial review of his claim that the agency had acted improperly or illegally. In short, granting the weight that the contrary arguments
have, on balance there seems little if any reason for us to continue on such an
unjustifiable course. As Mr. Justice Stewart aptly pointed out in his dissenting
opinion in Oestereich, the very people who need preinduction judicial review the
most are those whose claims are unclear and debatable; those who are rather sure
they will be vindicated in the end can more safely refuse to report for induction
or submit to induction and then bring a habeas corpus action.48 Moreover, the
inequities that have resulted between the rich and the poor, the educated and
uneducated, the white and the nonwhite from the system as it has been (and to
a somewhat lesser extent still is) administered (so far as availability of legal adi
vice and assistance, making of conscientious objector and hardship deferment
claims, etc.) are inexcusable and should be eliminated to the greatest extent
possible. Allowance of across-the-board preinduction review moves imperfectly in
that direction.
It should be made clear that in no wise is it suggested that preinduction
judicial review is constitutionally required. The Court settled that rather clearly
in Clark v. Gabriel, as discussed earlier, and no decision since has impaired that
holding. Indeed, the recent decision in Fein v. Selective Service Board"9 confirms and builds upon Gabriel. Nonetheless, it should be apparent that what is
minimally required constitutionally is not a necessary measure of sound and fair
procedure. From the registrant's point of view the presently available alternatives
for obtaining either administrative or judicial review of his classification are un48 393 U.S. at 251-52.
49 405 U.S. 365 (1972).
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satisfactory in many respects. Both criminal prosecution and habeas corpus can
result in a restriction on an individual's freedom in a variety of ways, in a
significant interruption of future plans, in loss of employment, in a daily life
clouded with uncertainty about the outcome of his case, and in a reduction in his
attractiveness to potential employers (especially the government). Moreover, the
period of uncertainty-and possibly unwarranted military service-is usually
substantial, since the normal district court proceeding can be expected to last
about six months, and, if the case is appealed, the time can extend up to two years
or more. If preinduction review were generally adopted there would of course still
be some delay and uncertainty. But the registrant's status would be finally
determined, and the outline of his legal and moral options would be clearly set out
in a comprehensible context following full and complete consideration of his
claims. That sort of approach would be eminently more consonant with general
notions of due process, even though not constitutionally required.
In view of the changes in Selective Service procedures whereunder individuals in the prime age group with low lottery numbers know rather long in
advance that they are likely to be drafted and are given their preinduction
physicals at a rather early date, a procedure could rather easily be worked out
which would require the filing of preinduction suits immediately upon determination of a registrant's physical fitness. Were this determination made some six
months or so prior to the time an individual would actually be expected to report
for induction, a district court proceeding could probably be completed prior to
the indicated induction date. If the court rejected the registrant's contentions
and upheld his classification no delay would result from allowing preinduction
review, unless the registrant took an appeal. In that case the court could determine whether to grant a stay pending appeal on the same bases that are
ordinarily applied in equitable actions, relying principally on what the chances
for success on appeal appeared to be. In that manner the registrant would at
least get a determination by one court prior to having to decide whether or not
to submit to induction and yet little if any delay would result. Such a procedure
would obviously be more palatable to challenging registrants and would hopefully result in a significantly greater degree of respect for the processes of the
System and the courts. And such a procedure would, in the long run, benefit the
System and the Armed Forces as well, for there would in fact, not simply in
theory, be less litigious interruption of the processing of manpower for military
service, and less interference with the ongoing operation of the Armed Forces as
well. Simply stated, time, expense and effort will be saved by the avoidance of
duplicative inductions and unnecessary litigation.
Concentration on the prime age group-registrants who are 19 years of age
-and adoption of the lottery system along with a uniform national call should
also have significant effects on the level of litigation likely to result. For one thing,
there will probably be considerably less questioning of one's obligations (including
military service) at this particular stage of an individual's life. For another, there
are probably relatively fewer teenagers, as compared with those in their 20's, who
would be inclined to initiate a lawsuit challenging their classification in the first
place. Many are probably still subject to the constraints of parents who tend to
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be more traditional in their outlook than their offspring and who would be unlikely to want to bear the expense of a lawsuit. Of course registrants in many
areas will have available to them the services of draft counselors and other groups
which have developed to assist individuals in their situation. Nonetheless, for the
reasons mentioned the overall amount of preinduction litigation is likely to be
considerably less than the System might fear, particularly if its own procedures
are further improved.
Admittedly, the timing of freely available preinduction judicial review and
the form it should take---given a substantial revision of the System's procedures
short of an organizational reworking of its machinery-remain sticky problems.
They are, however, probably less difficult problems if such reforms are accomplished than they would be otherwise; indeed, as discussed subsequently, if such
reforms are not effected-and many already have been-there is little if any approach that will measurably assist in reducing the burdens attendant to judicial
review.
An argument sometimes made against allowing preinduction review on a
full-scale basis is that this would result in a clogging of court dockets. This notion
suffers from the same fallacy as the one about avoiding delay and interruption of
the conscription process. Court dockets are just as clogged by criminal prosecutions and habeas corpus cases as they would be by preinduction suits, as the
figures noted earlier" indicate. With the winding down and ending of the war
the level of cases will stabilize and start to decline, as a reflection of the significantly smaller draft calls of the past several years. But the reduction in the
numbers of those drafted would of course be reflected in the level of preinduction litigation no less than in other forms. One interesting piece on the whole subject concludes that the court-clogging argument is without substance, and, in
pertinent part, states as follows:
The argument that the dockets of the courts will be clogged with the
bills of litigious registrants asserting frivolous claims is unpersuasive. The
truly frivolous claims may be dispensed with quickly by the courts. Furthermore, as the value of litigation as a delaying tactic decreases, the likelihood
of a registrant's bringing suit increases with his belief in the merits of his
claim. An allegation that is incapable of early dismissal is precisely the type
of claim that is worth the inconvenience of the agency and the time and
effort of the courts."'
It has also been suggested that to allow preinduction review would create
confusion in the whole Selective Service area since divergent court opinions
would necessarily result. This, the argument goes, would in turn create uncertainty in the minds of System officials and reduce respect for the System and its
determinations. Again, this position suffers from the same general defect as the
ones discussed above. Preinduction judicial review is no more likely to create
legal confusion in the area than other modes of judicial review. Conflicting
court decisions can be (and have been, as the earlier discussion indicates)
50 See p. 1170 supra.
51 Note, Judicial Review of Selective Service Classifications, 56 VA:. L. Rzv. 1288, 1320
(1970).
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rendered just as easily in criminal cases and habeas proceedings as in preinduction suits. As to all classes of cases the appellate process would hopefully resolve
most of the inconsistencies and differences, and this would occur sooner, not
later, if preinduction review were generally allowed. Moreover, improvement of
the administrative processes and extensive publication of uniform guidelines are
likely to help reduce this amount of inconsistency. Allowing preinduction review
at least gives a registrant a chance for a judicial determination (and appellate
review in appropriate circumstances) prior to his having to take a definitive
step in regard to his pending induction. Apparent inconsistencies are endemic
to a judicial review system in any event; thus, this argument hardly provides a
sound basis for rejecting preinduction review.
A shift to general availability of preinduction review would resolve existing
incongruities and inconsistencies in the law which have, on close inspection, little
reason to support them. As a result of the Supreme Court's decisions in the
Oestereich and Breen cases, the 10(b) (3) ban on preinduction suits has significant loopholes. Moreover, in enacting the 1971 statute extending the draft
and amending the Act in various respects, Congress did not see fit to rewrite
section 10(b) (3) or otherwise indicate its disagreement or displeasure with the
Court's holdings in those cases. This may result in something short of legislative
ratification, but since Congress has tolerated a limited undermining of its effort
to rule out preinduction review, the argument that an across-the-board ban is
what Congress intended and obtained is unavailing to those who oppose preinduction review on the basis of principle. Across-the-board preinduction review
undoubtedly involves a sounder and more acceptable approach to the thorny
problem of clarifying a registrant's obligations before he is required to take the
definitive step of refusing or accepting induction. And it would achieve this
purpose without significant detriment to the System, the Armed Forces or the
courts. Arguments against its adoption, as has been demonstrated, are misconceived and unpersuasive. The patchwork system of judicial review that presently
prevails is a corrupt and inefficient one; it should be laid to rest and preinduction
review-through civil actions brought by registrants in federal district courtsshould be substituted in its place.
III. Changes in the Administrative Handling
of Selective Service Cases
It is the considered conclusion of this writer that no adjustment of the
method or timing of judicial review is likely to be efficacious in significantly
ameliorating the burdens placed on the judiciary by the Selective Service litigation, or in substantially enhancing the overall fairness of the process for registrants, unless sweeping changes are made in the related administrative machinery.
Some will suggest that extending preinduction review to all registrants would
not help measurably since 1) the scope of review is very narrow in any event,
and 2) many registrants simply seek to defy the law and such a move would
merely delay criminal prosecutions in their cases. As to the former, while the
scope of review of Selective Service determinations under the "basis in fact"
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test is indeed narrow, this hardly argues against preinduction review, as has been
shown. As to the latter point, the fact that preinduction review might provide
some registrants with another avenue for delay in seeking to avoid their obligation of military service should not be a reason for denying the benefits of such
an approach to the vast majority of registrants who would not abuse it. Frivolous
claims could be handled expeditiously and, as indicated earlier, if judicial review
is properly administered in regard to timing, little if any delay should result,
particularly where the cases have been handled more effectively at the administrative levels. But for a preinduction review system not to interfere significantly
with the ordinary operation of the System, there must be proper management
in a more general sense. Indeed, if procedural reforms are accomplished so that
the administrative process is operating effectively, very few cases should be subject to judicial reversal and relatively few should cause the courts great difficulty.
Indeed, the more effective and fair the administrative handling of a case, the
less likely it is that judicial review of any kind will even be sought--except by
those whose claims, since without merit, can be disposed of readily.
Revision of the System's processes and procedures is thus, in my view,
intimately and inextricably related to the problem of judicial review. Others
have written at great length about the System and its processes, in legal periodicals, in separate books, and otherwise. There is not, it is fair to say, a complete congruence of opinion, but the overriding sentiment seems to be that the
System's machinery is substantially outmoded in its organization and operation.
Sweeping changes in this regard, most seem to agree, are necessary for the System to be effective in its task of raising manpower for our Armed Forces within
congressional guidelines which presumably reflect national policy while treating,
and perhaps more importantly appearing to treat, all registrants fairly. If the
System does it job better it will 1) reduce the incentive to seek judicial review
since it is unlikely to produce anything but delay and prolonged uncertainty in
individual cases, and if these are the registrant's goals, a more effective administrative operation will enable courts to deal expeditiously with the rather frivolous
cases in which this is the principal aim, and 2) enable the courts to do their job
of review more efficiently since they will a) be working with substantially more
informative administrative records than they are getting now and b) have more
confidence in the System's decision-making processes and thus the decisions
arrived at through those processes.
A number of suggestions for thoroughgoing reform of the Selective Service
System have been made by the various commissions and individuals who have
studied it during the past few years. It is my view that the approach proposed
by the so-called Marshall Commission52 includes most of the important features
that such a revision should entail, and that the legislation proposed by Senator
Kennedy" (which incorporates many of the Marshall Commission recommen-

52 NATIONAL ADVISORY CommisSION ON SELECTIVE SERVICE, IN PURSUIT OF E9UITY: WHO
SERVES WHEN NOT ALL SERVE? (1967).

S. 483, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See generally the hearings of the subcommittee
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice
and Procedureof the Senate judiciary Committee, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1969).
53

chaired by Senator Kennedy.
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dations, although it is less sweeping in scope) provides the best way to deal with
the problem. There are, however, sound reasons for proposing a significantly
more modest reform of the System than that proposed by the Marshall Commission (and even than that sponsored by Senator Kennedy). One is that it
is simply easier to effect small changes than large ones. Second is that many if
not all the necessary changes could be made through executive order and the
promulgation of revised regulations, without the need for congressional action;
indeed, steps in this direction have already been taken, such as the executive
elimination of occupational deferments and having registrants report for physicals before induction orders are issued. Third, and perhaps most significant, is
the political impracticality of any substantial revision of the Selective Service
System within the near future, against the background of the so-called Gates
Commission's recommendation for an all-volunteer Armed Forces," abandonment of the draft with the end of the Vietnam conflict and the impending
expiration of induction authority, and a rather consistent congressional resistance
to changes in the System as it has been organized in the past. Moreover, there
are significant economic factors involved in any total reworking of the System's
machinery.
A. Recent Improvements and Their Effect on
the Feasibility of Preinduction Review
Many of the needed modifications in the administrative processes have, as
a matter of fact, already been accomplished. Changes in the statute and regulations effected in late 1971 are of significance in two central respects. First, they
result in a reduction of the number and kinds of discretionary determinations
that Selective Service officials are called upon to make, and thus cut down on
the potential number of situations in which judicial review of such determinations might be sought. Second, they provide for a substantial number of
procedural protections for registrants that were not previously accorded, and
thus, by improving the fairness and reliability of the administrative process,
make efforts to obtain judicial review less likely and provide a sounder basis for
such review in cases where it is in fact sought.
Although authorized by section 6 (h) of the Act 5 , occupational deferments
were dispensed with by presidential order in April 1970, along with dependency
deferments for paternity. Thus, even before enactment of the 1971 statute, no
new occupational deferments were available and the range of dependency deferments was reduced considerably so as to include only bona fide hardship situations. Moreover, as part of the 1971 statute, section 6(h) (1), which provided
for college student deferments, was entirely repealed. That provision, although
not in terms requiring a discretionary determination by local and appeal boards,
encompassed a significant number of draft-eligible individuals (between 1.5 and
2 million) and had been the source of continuing controversy between registrants
54
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and the System. Accordingly, the types of discretionary determinations that
System officials are required to make in classifying registrants have now been
reduced to two principal ones: 1) conscientious objector and 2) dependency
(hardship) deferments.
This is not to suggest that questions will no longer be raised about other
sorts of determinations; some registrants may challenge decisions relating to
ministerial exemption claims, sole surviving son exemption claims, deferments
for membership in reserve components, and determinations involving physical
fitness for service. Such claims are not likely to be numerous, however, and their
resolution will not ordinarily be a matter of great difficulty for the local and
appeal boards. For the future, then, most of the contested situations will involve
one of the two aforementioned matters: conscientious objection and dependency
deferment claims. As to the latter category the system has a relatively well-developed set of considerations that have apparently lent themselves to generally
consistent and comprehensible application by the local and appeal boards,
although some complaints have been made about the asserted lack of "definite
objective criteria." While the decisions in such cases are in terms discretionary,
the standards delineated in 32 C.F.R. § 1622.30 (1972) and related local board
memoranda seem to have been spelled out sufficiently so as not to be the source
of a significant number of disputed claims. In any event, focusing the draft on
the prime age group of 19 should result in a greatly decreased number of hardship deferment claims, and it appears reasonable to assume that this approach
will continue to obtain.
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about the standards governing the
granting or denial of claims for conscientious objector status. Decisions and
opinions of the Supreme Court in the leading cases of United States v. Seeger 6
and Welsh v. United States"7 have stretched the statutory language almost to
the breaking point, have generated an extensive amount of literature attempting
to interpret and explain the law as there defined, and have left the System and
the local and appeal boards in an almost intolerable situation insofar as application in close, individual cases is concerned. Congress chose not to provide any
further guidance or enlightenment in the 1971 statute, however, so the System
is faced with the problem of dealing with this large and difficult problemthrough regulations, local board memoranda, etc.-in the best way it can devise.
Some substantial changes in the way C.O. claims are presently handled seem
warranted by statistics showing that such claims comprise a significant and
growing source of dispute between the System and registrants. A different and
hopefully more workable manner of handling such claims is suggested at a later
point,5" along with the recommendation of other procedural changes that should
be made.
A second important change that the 1971 statute and regulations have
worked involves the reaffirmation of the random selection (or draft lottery) method along with the adoption of the so-called "uniform national call." In effect, with
56
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the drastic reduction (culminating in the elimination) of draft calls during the
past several years as the Vietnam conflict has been wound down and the size of
the Armed Forces reduced, the System has developed a flexible attitude and
equitable approach toward the selection of those who will in fact be called to
serve. In short, fewer have been subjected to calls from a larger pool, a one-year
exposure through the 19-year-old prime age group concept coupled with the
lottery system greatly reduced the period of uncertainty about each individual's
draft status, and the uniform national call tends to reduce inequities that might
otherwise result from differing interpretations of the controlling law across the
country. Moreover, by conducting the lottery for each year at a point in time
substantially before an individual becomes exposed to possible liability for training and service and by creating a new classification category, I-H,"I the System
has gone a long way toward cutting down on the number who might even seek
to challenge their classification while increasing the amount of time for planning
for the future and (not without some relevance to the earlier discussion) to bringing suits prior to induction. Those classified I-H (termed a "holding classification") are regarded, because of the unlikelihood of their being called in view of
their lottery number, as registrants "not currently subject to processing for induction."6 Since these registrants are not classified I-A and are not likely to be so
classified during the year of their maximum exposure to the draft, short of a
drastic change in our military situation, the number of those registrants even in
a position to justifiably and legitimately complain about their classification is
considerably reduced. Finally, the System has developed a policy of ordering
those likely to be called to report for and take physicals at a relatively early date
so that an early determination of whether they are physically and mentally qualified can be made, again providing for an early clarification of the situations of
registrants who are actually or potentially (because their lottery numbers are
borderline in view of expected draft calls) affected. All in all, the System deserves plaudits for developing various approaches that, by building on existing
and changed legislation, both remove the element of uncertainty for as many
individuals as possible and provide for an earlier determination of the status
of those who are not otherwise exempted from the requirement of service. As
pointed out previously, these developments are of obvious significance in considering the feasibility of adopting the approach of freely available preinduction
judicial review.
The third major statutory and regulatory development involves the addition
in 1971 of a new section 22 at the end of the Act which, for the first time, spells
out through legislation a number of procedural rights which are to be accorded
to registrants. These rights are amplified to some extent by the regulations
thereafter adopted. Section 22 (a) provides that "a fair hearing consistent with
59
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(see 32 C.F.R. § 1622.2 (1972)) prescribe that it will be a temporary category in which those
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being classified I-A.
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will be classified I-A (and in effect placed for a year in standby status should the draft need
for some reason to be resumed). All others will be given a I-H or some lower classification.
See note 94 infra.
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the informal and expeditious processing which is required by selective service
cases" is thereby guaranteed "to each registrant asserting a claim before a local
or appeal board."'" The general requirement for a "fair hearing' in Selective
Service cases would seem to embody a congressional judgment that certain
procedures could be successfully challenged for failure to comply with this standard. More specifically, section 22(b) provides as follows:
(b) Pursuant to such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe(1) Each registrant shall be afforded the opportunity to appear in person
before the local or any appeal board of the Selective Service System to

testify and present evidence regarding his status.
(2) Subject to reasonable limitations on the number of witnesses and the
total time allotted to each registrant, each registrant shall have the
right to present witnesses on his behalf before the local board.
(3) A quorum of any local board or appeal board shall be present during
the registrant's personal appearance.
(4) In the event of a decision adverse to the claim of a registrant, the
local or appeal board making such decision shall, upon request, furnish
to such registrant a brief written statement of the reasons for its
decision.6 2 (emphasis added)

Even though section 22 (b) is prefaced by a reference to implementation through
regulations, it seems clear that Congress did not intend to leave the question of
whether to adopt such regulations up to the System. Rather, the statutory language merely leaves it up to the System (as agent of the President in this regard)
to determine what form the implementing regulations should take. Failure to
adopt regulations that reflect the underlying intent of Congress would be in
conflict with the statutory provisions; indeed, the System did so respond and,
after proposing regulations that seemed less than fully reflective of the legislative
purpose, adopted amended regulations that more or less adequately do so. Those
regulations will be discussed at some length below. For the present it seems
appropriate to note what procedural protections Congress intended to confer
upon registrants and, through omission, which ones it failed to provide that remain important if not essential to the development of a fair and responsive
administrative process in which both registrants and courts can have confidence.
It is worthy of note, at the outset, that Congress has, with the enactment
of the 1971 statute, for the first time expressly included specific and enumerated
procedural protections in the Selective Service laws. That is no mean accomplishment in itself, in view of the background of legislation in this area and the
general antipathy toward meaningful procedural protections for registrants that
traditionally has been manifested by both the System and the appropriate congressional committees. Apart from a passing reference to "a system of selection
which is fair and just" in 50 U.S.C. App. 451 (c) (1970), no previous legislation
in the Selective Service field had included any provisions that sought to affirmatively protect the rights of individuals actually or potentially affected by the
draft laws. In short, while Congress did not go as far as some proponents of
61 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 471(a) (Supp. 1972).
62 Id. at § 471(b).
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reform of the Selective Service statute would have liked, the mere fact that it did
take some action along the lines of procedural reform is significant and indicafive, it would appear, that legislative provision for additional procedural protections is not out of the question. It might be noted, however, that these procedural provisions were added as floor amendments and thus there is very little
legislative history to indicate what the underlying congressional motivation was
in adopting them.63
Congressional insistence in section 22 (a) that a "fair hearing" be provided
to registrants is amplified by the more specific provisions of Section 22(b).
Probably the most important of these specific requirements, at least from the
point of view of facilitating judicial review, is the one providing for a "brief
written statement of the reasons for its decision" by any local or appeal board
rendering a determination adverse to a registrant's claim. Previously there was
no requirement whatever that local or appeal boards give reasons for the decisions they made. Thus, in seeking judicial review a registrant was relegated to
a speculation contest with the government about why the board denied his claim,
and it was a contest in which the cards were stacked heavily against him because
of the narrow "no basis in fact" standard for judicial review.
That standard, announced in the Estep u. United States" case over 25
years ago, as a liberalization of a statute that purported to proscribe
judicial review entirely, was incorporated by Congress in section 10(b) (3)
of the Act in 1967. In effect, the registrant faced with the burden of showing
that "no basis in fact" existed for the board decision but with no statement at
all from the board about why it denied his claim could expect to prevail in court
only in the clearest cases of board arbitrariness or legal error. All he could do,
in constructing a case for a court to consider, was to put together a collection
of the materials that he had filed with the board, make some reference to the
questions and statements of board members at his personal appearance (if
indeed any record of that event was maintained), and hope to convince the
court that the board could have done what it did only for improper reasons. In
this regard the line of cases involving alleged "punitive reclassification" (such
as Oestereich, Gutknecht and Breen) are atypical, as previously suggested, since
in that situation General Hershey's directive to local boards provided the courts
with a sound basis for concluding that delinquency declarations and reclassifications had occurred only because of impermissible factors. By way of contrast,
the Court's decision in Clark v. Gabriel,which for all practical purposes approved
the statutory preclusion of preinduction judicial review where determinations of
a discretionary character are involved, is more indicative of the dilemma facing
a registrant who had not been provided with a statement of the reasons for
the board's decision.
Thus, the statutory requirement of a statement of reasons is a large and
important step forward in improving the fairness and reliability of the administrative process. Boards cannot act in a vindictive and freewheeling manner, to
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borrow some of Justice Douglas' language,6 5 for they are now required to state
reasons in support of what they have done. It is thus reasonable to expect better
and more consistent decision-making from the boards simply because they are
now required to say why they did what they did. Moreover, particularly in
situations involving discretionary determinations, the requirement for a statement of reasons should greatly facilitate judicial review. There is of course
always the possibility that the statement provided will not in fact disclose the
actual reasons underlying the particular decision. But, assuming good faith
compliance with the statutory requirement, this should be the exception and
not the rule. In most cases, then, the reviewing court will now know what the
board's rationale was and thus the guessing game which previously went on in
this regard, and which imposed a serious burden on registrants, should be substantially done away with. In the hopefully few cases where the board has made
an error of law in denying a claim the court can readily determine this from its
statement of reasons. And in the cases involving discretionary determinations
the court can more easily ascertain whether an abuse of that discretion is involved
or whether the board instead acted within the proper ambit of its authority.
In short, reviewing courts will now have, for the first time, a meaningful record
to evaluate when considering challenges to board decisions.
An important caveat regarding the requirement for a statement of reasons
should be noted. There has apparently been a tendency, in the short time the
requirement has been in effect, for many boards to do nothing more than provide
an almost verbatim recital of the language of a pertinent statutory provision or
regulation. Obviously this is wholly inadequate to provide any meaningful basis
for judicial review. It is not, fairly considered, consistent with the clear congressional mandate, nor calculated to illuminate or engender confidence in the System
on the part of registrants. Courts should peremptorily refuse to accept such
empty recitals of conclusory language by Selective Service boards. Otherwise,
the requirement will be rendered virtually meaningless.
Another important procedural protection provided for by section 22(b)
is the right given to registrants to present witnesses on their behalf before local
boards; previously, the registrant could file letters, affidavits, etc., with the local
board incident to his personal appearance but could not seek to further support
his claim with live statements or testimony. Live witnesses are not only likely
to make more of an impression on the board members but their presence will
provide the board with an opportunity to question them about their views as
to the registrant and his claim, and will thereby promote more informed decisionmaking by the local boards. The value of this protection is reduced somewhat
by the statutory authorization for reasonable restrictions on the number of witnesses and the amount of time allotted to each registrant in appearing before
the board; under the revised regulations the registrant is given only 15 minutes
for his personal appearance (unless the board decides to give him more time)
and is limited to three witnesses. Whether the three witnesses' testimony takes

up part of the 15 minutes is unclear. In any event, while recognizing the need
65 See Oestereich v. Selective Service Board, 393 U.S. 233, 237 (1968).
66 36 Fed. Reg. 21077 (1971).
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for some reasonable limitations in these respects, it is particularly difficult to
justify the 15-minute time restriction (the limitation to three witnesses seems
more sensible and supportable). Perhaps flexibility in administration will serve
to ensure fairness in the operation of the system but the grudging narrowness of
the regulations in this regard is bothersome.
Section 22(b) also gives registrants the right to a personal appearance not
only before local boards (which had previously existed under the regulations)
but also before appeal boards. This reform, which coupled with the others
discussed above, is significant in that it will hopefully tend to make an administrative appeal a less perfunctory procedure, engaged in principally to exhaust
administrative remedies so as to be able to seek judicial review, and instead
convert it into a meaningful first step in the review process. A right to appear
before appeal boards is especially important in view of the perpetuation of the
notion that review by appeal boards is de novo in character, as is the aforementioned requirement that appeal boards as well as local boards provide the
registrant with a statement of reasons. A more straightforward approach would
be to do away with the de novo review concept entirely and recognize that appeal boards are probably applying something akin to a "substantial evidence"
standard in reviewing local board decisions. However, the modifications made
in the regulations dealing with appeal board procedures, particularly the requirement in 32 G.F.R. 1626.4 (1972) that the board shall consider only "information contained in the record made by the local board," along with "general
information concerning economic, industrial, and social conditions" and the
"oral statements of the registrant to the appeal board during his personal appearance," are helpful and go a considerable way toward blunting the effects of
the de novo concept which had heretofore provided the government with a
way of shielding erroneous local board decisions from penetrating judicial
scrutiny.
A final procedural requirement added by section 22(b) is that a quorum
of the members of any local board or appeal board be present during a registrant's personal appearance. Previously the attendance by one member of a
board was regarded as adequate and the registrant was hardly accorded the
thoroughgoing consideration by all members of the decision-making body that
fairness would appear to dictate. Indeed, it seems strange that it was necessary
to incorporate such an elementary requirement into the statute but the practice
of many boards, where most decisions were made by the regularly employed
clerks and not the members themselves, apparently led Congress to conclude
that such inclusion was necessary.
Brief mention should also be made of another not insignificant procedural
change incorporated in the 1971 statute, but in a location other than the
newly added section 22. That change results, in effect, in application of the
basic requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, relating to rulemaking,
to the promulgation of regulations by the Selective Service System, although
the APA in terms remains inapplicable to Selective Service proceedings. Section
13(b) 67 of the Act was amended to include a provision requiring publication of
67
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all such regulations in the Federal Register and prescribing that they would be
ineffective until 30 days thereafter. Moreover, the new provision further states
that "any person shall be given an opportunity to submit his views to the Director
on such regulation" prior to its becoming effective, although "no formal hearing
shall be required on any such regulation."" It should be noted, however, that
this requirement may be waived by the President in certain specified circumstances in the interest of national defense. As a result, both formal notice of
and some opportunity to be heard regarding proposed regulations are now, for
the first time, applicable in the Selective Service context as well as in other
administrative areas. The result, hopefully, will be better for both registrants
and the System.
Most of the significant changes in the pertinent Selective Service regulations
either track or implement the statutory provisions and they have already, to a
considerable extent, been discussed incident to the discussion of the statutory
changes. A few other changes should be noted in passing. One change that
appears ill-advised is the shortening of the period within which a registrant must
request a personal appearance before a local board from 30 to 15 days after
receipt by him of a classification notice. Many registrants will probably seek
the advice of an attorney upon receipt of a classification notice which effectively
rejects a claim they have asserted. With the board now required to state reasons
for its decision, it would seem likely that more registrants will seek personal
appearances than before (on a percentage basis). Cutting down on the period
of time within which to decide on whether to seek a personal appearance would
seem to intensify the temptation to seek such a hearing almost automatically.
While restricting the time period might serve the purpose of expedition, it might
well invite some registrants to seek a personal appearance where, upon reflection
and consideration, and upon the advice of counsel, they might decide not to do
so. Also, since the time is now quite short it would seem essential for the board
to advise the registrant of the need to take prompt action in order to obtain a
personal appearance.
The potential problems created by the regulations dealing with the limitations on the duration of the personal appearance and the number of witnesses
that can be used have been discussed previously. One helpful addition to the
regulations is a provision requiring local boards to give a registrant a statement
of reasons for its refusal to reopen a classification when requested to do so.
The time within which to apply to an appeal board from a local board determination has also been shortened from 30 to 15 days; 9 this change is subject
to some of the same problems that were discussed above as to the like reduction
in seeking a personal appearance before a local board. Moreover, since local
boards are now required to state reasons for their decisions, more instead of
less time would seem warranted in order to give the registrant and his advisors
an opportunity to decide whether to go to an appeal board or not. Experience
of the System with these particular revisions in the regulations would seem an
important factor, but on the whole the development appears to be unwise.
68 Id.
69 36 Fed. Reg. 21078 (1971).
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B. Other ProceduralChanges That Should Be Made
Comment should also be made about several additional procedural changes
that have been suggested but were not made, either by statute or regulation. The
most significant one involves representation by counsel at local board proceedings. The System has consistently opposed this step and has included a specific
provision in the revised regulations that states: "No registrant may be represented before the local board by anyone acting as attorney or legal counsel."" °
Apparently the attitude of the System is that allowing representation by counsel
at board proceedings would so judicialize them as to interfere with the orderly
and expeditious processing of cases. All things considered, that view seems unfounded. Legal representation is allowed to individuals and business entities in
an array of situations where the interests potentially affected are of far less
consequence than in the Selective Service context. Examples are myriad and
need not be detailed. Moreover, the more affluent and better-educated registrant
is demonstrably favored by a system which disallows legal representation. Such
a registrant can handle himself more effectively before a board, and also can
afford to retain counsel to consult and advise him prior to his personal appearance, especially in C.O. cases where the standards are complex and confusing.
The poorer and less well-educated registrant, particularly in areas where extensive draft counseling services have not been developed, is almost hopelessly entrapped by the system when seeking to proceed without legal counsel. The socalled government "appeal agents" have never functioned effectively in advising
registrants of their rights since they of necessity have a dual allegiance which
seems often to be resolved in favor of the interests of the System. Thus, denial
of legal representation, or at least the opportunity for consultation with a lawyer,
works a significant discrimination against the less affluent and poorer educated
registrant. The conscientious objection area, now that ethical and moral beliefs
carry significant weight, presents special problems as far as the latter aspect of
discrimination is concerned. Certainly, more often than not, the better-educated
registrant will have an advantage over the poorer one when he is called upon to
justify and substantiate his beliefs.
Whatever hazards to the administrative process might result from allowing
legal representation might well be counteracted by a number of companion steps.
One might be to ensure that each board had at least one lawyer as a member.
It may take some time to accomplish this but, with the cooperation of the
organized bar, it can undoubtedly be done. Moreover, reasonable time limitations could still be imposed on personal appearances. Indeed, if thought necessary, at least at the outset, consultation with an attorney present at the proceeding might be allowed but not full-fledged legal representation, in the sense that
the lawyer would speak for the registrant to the board. Other similar restrictions
that are reasonable in nature might be imposed to ensure that the process is not
overly judicialized. At the same time, however, it is unrealistic to seek to maintain
that the board members are simply a small and friendly group of neighbors
seeking to do what is good for a young man. Proceedings are presently adversary
70 Id. at 21077.
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in character, whether the System admits it or not. Counsel is allowed in so many
other situations where the effects of the body's decision on an individual are of
far less consequence that it seems grossly incongruous to continue to maintain
the system as it has been. The fear of the System in this regard seems irrational
and misguided. Some court is likely to hold that counsel is required as a matter
of due process in the not too distant future in any event71 and the System will
then be left with less flexibility in shaping the manner in which legal representation will be allowed.
Several final points should be added. Apart from the previously expressed
concern about perpetuation of the de novo review concept with regard to appeal
board decisions, an additional procedural improvement that seems warranted,
along with the allowing of representation by counsel, is ensuring that a transcript
of the proceedings before the local and appeal boards be prepared and be made
available to registrants. It would appear that this could easily be accomplished
by tape-recording such proceedings and then preparing a transcript only in those
cases where one was requested. Presumably this would be a small percentage
of the cases, when the impact of the procedural reforms already accomplished is
considered. Nonetheless, in some cases the ability to prepare a transcript from a
tape recording would seem to be of considerable significance for effective administrative and judicial review-the System, the courts and the registrants would
appear to benefit from this sort of arrangement at very little cost. Tapes could
be preserved for a period of time and then erased and reused. Registrants who
could afford to do so would simply be provided with the tape for use in preparing
a transcript; those who were financially unable to do so would have transcripts
prepared at government expense.
Lastly, steps should be taken to ensure the independence of the National
Appeal Board from System officials. In this regard, the appearance as well as
reality of independence seems quite important. Registrants who have confidence
in the impartiality of the National Appeal Board are less likely to be dissatisfied
with its decisions and seek judicial review. Changes in the regulations relating
to the National Appeal Board unfortunately appear to do nothing along these
lines. Nor do they broaden the jurisdiction of the Board in any significant respect; only the National Director and appropriate State Director can appeal to
the National Appeal Board as a matter of right,7 2 except in the situation where
the state appeal board was not unanimous, in which case the registrant himself
can seek National Appeal Board review. Procedural changes in large measure
parallel those relating to appeals to state appeal boards; for example, the time
within which a registrant entitled to make an appeal must take such action is
71 Cf. United States v. Weller, 401 U.S. 254 (1971). In Weller the district court had dismissed the prosecution of a registrant for failure to submit to induction on the ground that
the Selective Service regulation prohibiting representation by counsel at his personal appearance before his local draft board was inconsistent with the basic statute (309 F. Supp. 50).
In so holding the lower court found it unnecessary to reach the defendant's constitutional
argument for counsel in Selective Service proceedings, premised primarily on due process
grounds, but it intimated that, had it been required to resolve the constitutional issue, it would
have done so in favor of the claim. Finding that it lacked jurisdiction on direct appeal under
the then extant provisions of Criminal Appeals Act (see 18 U.S.C. § 3731), the Supreme
Court remanded without resolving the merits.
72 32 C.F.R. § 1627.1(a) (1972).
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rather short (15 days from the mailing of his Notice of Classification, as with
personal appearances before local boards and appeals to state appeal boards)."
Unless a registrant whose classification is being appealed to the National Appeal
Board requests a personal appearance before that body, the regulations provide
that the Board "shall proceed forthwith to classify" such an individual. 4 A
registrant whose case is being appealed to the Board is allowed to "present
evidence, other than witnesses, bearing on his classification," is entitled to 15
minutes for his appearance before the Board, but may not "be represented before
the National Board by anyone acting as attorney or legal counsel." 5 Like the
local and appeal boards, the National Appeal Board is now required to provide to
registrants whose claims are rejected "a brief statement of the reasons" for its
decision.76 Suggestions for improvements of the regulations relating to the National Appeal Board include the following: ensure its independence by providing
for its financial and physical support through channels other than the System;
broaden its jurisdiction to include, at least on a discretionary basis, appeals from
all registrants whose claims were rejected by state appeal boards; allow registrants
to be represented by counsel before the Board (even stronger reasons of policy
appear to support allowing representation by counsel at appellate board proceedings than at local board appearances) ; abolish the de novo concept with regard to
National Appeal Board action;" and lastly and somewhat more tentatively,
provide the Board with a functioning permanent staff and give consideration to
having its members serve on a full-time rather than part-time basis. A caveat
should be noted, however. It might be questioned whether, in light of the apparent move to an all-volunteer Armed Forces, the beefing up of the National
Board along the lines suggested is at present an item of high priority.
None of the above suggestions regarding procedural reforms that should, in
my judgment, still be accomplished is premised on the notion that due process
requires that they be done. Any such constitutional argument was, it would appear, effectively laid to rest by the U.S. Supreme Court in its recent decision in
Fein v. Selective Service System." There the Court not only confirmed its upholding of the validity of section 10(b) (3)'s prohibition on preinduction judicial
review in situations involving discretionary determinations made by local boards"
but also had occasion to discuss the procedural changes made incident to the
enactment of the 1971 statute and the adoption of implementing regulations. In
its opinion the Court expressly quoted the pertinent provisions of section 22 (as
discussed previously) and the related regulations, while indicating that neither
were intended to have retroactive effect. After reviewing the statutory provisions
and regulatory changes the Court stated that they had "alleviated and, indeed,
eliminated" most objections to the preexisting procedures based on due process
grounds, and similarly concluded that "all, or nearly all, the procedural features
73
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about which [petitioner] complains ... have been changed administratively."' S
Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion, focused explicitly on the procedural due process issue, asserting that serious due process questions are raised
by the Court's construction of section 10(b) (3). Referring to the "fair and
just" system language of section 1 (c) of the Act, Justice Douglas skirted the due
process question by suggesting that Congress intended that certain procedural
requirements be adhered to, even prior to the 1971 amendments to the statute.
Since he found that such requirements were not followed he thought that preinduction judicial review was proper, despite section 10(b) (3), under Oestereich.- Justices Marshall and Stewart also dissented, but their disagreement
with the Court's opinion related to what they regarded as an unduly narrow interpretation and application of Oestereich; they suggested that preinduction
judicial review should be allowed where "the registrant [has] challenged a
purportedly valid Selective Service rule of general application, the validity of
which the administrative process could not completely adjudicate before induction." 2 Noting that where, as in Fein, "Selective Service appellate procedures, implemented under Selective Service regulations ... arguably conflict
with the constitutional requirements of the Due Process Clause" an a fortiori
case for preinduction review has been made out, the dissenters sought to distinguish Gabriel. Thus, since the dissenting opinions expressly urged the desirability of allowing preinduction review where potential procedural due process
issues were presented, it is a reasonable inference that the Court's majority in
effect rejected the soundness of any arguments along these lines. Indeed, by
reference to the statutory and regulatory changes the Court seemed to be indicating that whatever possible due process questions might be raised had effectively been blunted by intervening developments. Accordingly, the suggestions
for further improvements and refinements of the administrative process are notand cannot be-grounded on the notion that the existing procedures are defective constitutionally. Rather, it is felt that such changes should be made
without regard to whether they are constitutionally required as a matter of
sound administrative policy and in order to ensure thoroughgoing fairness to all
registrants. To reiterate, what is minimally required constitutionally is not, of
course, the necessary standard for measuring wisdom or soundness as a matter of
policy.
IV. Special Problems Presented by the Administrative Handling of
Conscientious Objector Claims
An ancillary but important point relating to the handling of conscientious
objector cases warrants discussion. As indicated earlier, I feel quite strongly
that the present system for handling C.O. claims is inadequate, ineffective and
often unjust. Despite efforts to clarify the guiding legal principles for local boards
80
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by the National Director's office, there is still a great amount of uncertainty,
arbitrariness and inconsistency in the handling of C.O. claims by local boards
(and by some appeal boards as well). The problem is a difficult one since the
legal concepts are abstruse and virtually defy comprehensible statement. They
derive in large measure from two leading Supreme Court cases of recent years
interpreting section 6(j) of the Act, the provision dealing with C.O. claims and
ostensibly establishing the standards therefor." Seeger and Welsh are the two
villains and they have left the law in such a confused state that few lawyers (or
law teachers) will attempt to state the present rules with any feeling of confidence.
Simply stated, the Court through a tortured process of statutory construction
that in Welsh did not commend itself even to a majority of the Justices (Harlan
reached the first amendment issue presented, resolved it against the Government, yet voted to uphold the Act on the ground that Congress would have
preferred that to a total invalidation of the exemption) extended the language
of section 6(j) to include sincere but nonreligious conscientious objection."
Earlier, in Seeger, the Court had concluded that C.O. status should be accorded, under section 6 (j), to a registrant with a "sincere and meaningful belief
which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the
God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption... ."6 That language was
written in purported interpretation of the statutory definition of "religious training and belief" which, in pertinent part, stated that Congress intended to include
only those with a "belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation, but not . . . [those with]

essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or merely personal moral
code."8 " Whether the Court's construction properly reflected congressional attitude or not is actually beside the point since, in 1967, Congress deleted any
reference to a "Supreme Being" in section 6(j), apparently accepting the Court's
test as enunciated in Seeger. But if Seeger was difficult to comprehend and apply,
Welsh compounded the problem considerably. There the Court's plurality opinion, while purporting to apply the Seeger test, effectively broadened that test to
include all sincere though nonreligious C.O.'s. In its opinion the Court attempted at several points, without great success, to articulate the standard it was
applying, and stated: "What is necessary under Seeger for a registrant's conscientious objection to all war to be 'religious' within the meaning of § 6(j) is
that this opposition to war stem from the registrant's moral, ethical, or religious
beliefs about what is right and wrong and that these beliefs be held with the
strength of traditional religious convictions."'8 Shortly thereafter the Court indicated that "an individual [who] deeply and sincerely holds beliefs which are
purely ethical or moral in source and content" was nonetheless within the ambit
of 6(j), and later the Court said that those "who hold strong beliefs about our
domestic and foreign affairs" or those whose C.O. claim "is founded to a sub84
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stantial extent upon considerations of public policy" are not as a result excluded
from entitlement to C.O.status. 9
The confused state in which this left the law was exemplified by the
issuance of a directive to local boards on the standards to apply in C.O.. cases by
the National Director shortly after the Welsh decision. A great amount of
criticism was initially levelled against that directive on the ground that it was too
narrow in stating the pertinent test, and the directive was withdrawn a month
or so later. Finally, another directive, somewhat more liberal in stating the
Seeger-Welsh criteria but in a way no less inscrutable than the language in those
opinions, was issued. As a consequence, despite considerable effort to avoid the
difficulty, it seems rather clear that compliance with these criteria is significantly
easier for the articulate, well-educated and affluent than for those not so advantaged. Moreover, it seems plain that local boards simply lack the requisite
expertise to resolve C.O. claims in a consistent and sensible fashion. Indeed, the
experience of the past several years, exemplified by cases such as that of Muhammed Ali," has been one of ineffective, inconsistent and entirely unsatisfactory application of the law by local boards in C.O. cases. Some boards apparently continue to allow only members of recognized "peace churches" to obtain the exemption, others make apparently ad hoc decisions and then recite the language of the
directive in support of their conclusions, and others are seemingly doing their
best to struggle with the difficult and ambiguous standards they are charged with
applying. The only thing that could have exacerbated the situation further would
have been a Supreme Court decision in Gillette v.United States9 upholding the
"selective" C.O. claim made in that case. However, the Court in that case rejected the contention that limiting the granting of C.O.status to those who oppose participation in all wars was constitutionally infirm; had it decided otherwise it is doubtful that the draft could have continued to function at all, and this
pragmatic consideration probably played a large part in the decision reached.
The congressional response to these cases was interesting; it did nothing to seek to
clarify the situation in the 1971 statute. In all likelihood Congress felt there was
little if anything it could do without ipitiating another round of litigation challenging the constitutionality of its actions and resulting in still further confusion
as a result of judicial interpretation.
To my way of thinking the whole system for handling C.O. claims is
presently an unconscionable one. It is grossly unfair to registrants since not only
are the standards confusing but a distinct preference is given to the affluent and
educated. It is similarly unfair to place the entire burden for resolving such
cases, some of which defy easy determination under the ambiguous criteria enunciated by the Court and left standing by Congress, on local and appeal boards of
the Selective Service System. Results being reached are disparate and this lack
of uniformity is not only productive of many of the cases where judicial review
is sought but it also tends to undermine confidence in the system. Little if any
clarification of the applicable standards can be expected in the near future. Thus,
89
90

91

Id. at 342.
Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698 (1971).

401 U.S. 437 (1971).

1198

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[June, 1973]

it seems incumbent on those concerned about the matter to proceed along the
lines of seeking procedural rather than substantive changes. Up until 1967 section 6(j) provided for reference of all appealed 0.O. claim cases to a Department of Justice hearing officer who investigated the claim thoroughly and produced an advisory opinion on whether or not the claim had validity. That
procedure was abandoned in 1967 through congressional amendment, mainly
because it was thought to be too time-consuming and a significant source of delay
at a time when our manpower needs were increasing rapidly. It is not suggested
that a return to that sort of system would be well-advised; it has a number of
problems inherent in it and there is likely to be little if any interest on the part of
the System, Congress, the Justice Department92 or anyone else (except for registrants) in such a step. However, some sort of analogous yet more expeditious
procedure for handling difficult C.O. cases seems well-advised and should be
given serious consideration. Although such a procedure could probably be
established by regulation without congressional authorization, the fact that there
was a previous scheme based on congressional mandate and the likely disinterest
of the System in any such procedure seem to argue for its accomplishment through
legislation.
Such a procedure might take a variety of forms. The objective would simply
be to provide local and appeal boards with a more informed judgment on how to
resolve troublesome and borderline 0.O. claims under the applicable legal standards, difficult and ambiguous as they are. Investigation and recommendation
authority might be centralized in the National Director's office, but this would
seem to present a number of the same problems that the Justice Department
hearing officer procedure did. I would favor an approach that would inject
some centralization (and with it legal expertise in the particular area) into the
process while maintaining a degree of decentralization at the same time. Thus,
I suggest that the focal point of this effort should be the State Director's offices
in each state. Lawyers, and perhaps some social scientists (sociologists, psychologists, etc.) as well, might be added to the State Director's staff for the specific
purpose of advising local and appeal boards on 0. 0. cases. Some investigatory
personnel might be needed also, but I doubt that it would be necessary to conduct
anything like the full-blown sort of inquiry formerly performed by the FBI. As to
the mechanics of the procedure, I suggest that two routes be provided for obtaining the advice (and all that would be provided would be an advisory report, not a
mandatory determination) of the State Director in contested and difficult C.O.
cases: 1) through referral by a local or appeal board at its own instance, or 2)
through request by a registrant appealing an adverse decision of a local board
to an appeal board (thus paralleling the previous procedure in this respect). A
simple and straightforward statutory amendment to section 6(j) to this effect
(or to one of the procedural provisions, such as section 10, if thought more appropriate) could easily be accomplished if sufficient congressional interest were
stimulated.
92 Especially bothered by the procedure was the FBI, which was charged with doing the
detailed investigative work.

[Vol. 48:1164]

JUDICIAL REVIEW IN SELECTIVE SERVICE CASES

1199

An imposing array of materials could be referred to in order to substantiate
the procedural mess that presently exists in regard to C.O. cases. Recent court
cases-as a quick survey of the Selective Service Law Reporter will indicate
-clearly confirm this as well. Thus some procedural change is badly needed
and the approach recommended seems to be a feasible and hopefully effective
one.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is recommended that a simple and straightforward preinduction judicial review procedure be established (or, actually, that access to the
civil injunction and declaratory relief93 approach that has already developed for
some cases be broadened and made available to all registrants). In view of the
present language of section 10(b) (3), this change would require congressional
action which, for a number of reasons, may at the present time be difficult if not
impossible to obtain. Nonetheless, if it is explained that such a procedure would
build upon a substantially enhanced and more elaborate administrative process,
along the lines indicated previously, and would not significantly interfere with the
raising of necessary manpower, the proposal seems well worth congressional consideration.
What is suggested, then, in substance, is that significant steps be taken to
improve the decision-making processes of the Selective Service System by building
on those improvements already made by statute and regulation in the past several
years, so as to engender more confidence in its decisions and facilitate judicial
review. No change in the standard of review is suggested, although a rather
persuasive argument can be made for shifting to a less stringent "substantial
evidence" standard instead of the existing "basis in fact" test. Such a shift would
probably not be politically acceptable; however, courts can (and likely do)
apply whatever standard they want under the guise of applying the one they
articulate. With improvement in the System's decision-making processes, it can
reasonably be expected that the problems attendant to judicial review will become
less acute. Those registrants who are disposed to litigate will probably do so at
whatever point they are allowed to, although it might cynically be argued that review should be delayed in the hope that they will either accept induction or be disqualified physically at a later point. However, as developed fully at an earlier
point, it seems basically unfair and discriminatory to force a registrant to be subjected to a criminal prosecution or recant an oath in order to test the correctness
of an administrative determination of great importance to him.
Thus, I propose that a simplified review proceeding in the district courts be
93 Declaratory judgment actions are of course a commonplace of our contemporary civil
procedure; it is perhaps not insignificant that, when a draft system was first devised for World
War I, the approach in the federal courts was a negative one insofar as declaratory relief was
concerned. Only during the 1930's did the Court clarify the matter in holding that declaratory actions were not inconsistent with article III's "case or controversy" limitation. See
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, (1933), and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970).
And only during the last several decades have declaratory actions been used with great frequency in the administrative context.
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made available to all registrants who wish to challenge their classification or
otherwise question the actions of the System; such a proceeding need not depend
on 28 U.S.C. 1331, which awkwardly prescribes a $10,000.00 jurisdictional
amount, or 28 U.S.C. 1361, whose coverage may be somewhat uncertain. Rather,
a registrant should have access to the appropriate district court to test the validity
of the Selective Service System's action in his case in a direct and straightforward
way. Such a review proceeding should not be available until after the registrant
has received an order to report for induction (though such orders should be
issued at an early date, once a registrant has been found physically qualified and
it is rather certain that he will in fact be called) except for conscientious objector
cases, in which it would be immediately available once the special administrative
process for handling such cases (assuming it is established) has been pursued.
Once a registrant has been ordered to report for induction and administrative
appeals have been exhausted, he should have a relatively short period-say, ten
days-within which to initiate such a review proceeding by filing a notice thereof,
and then another relatively short period-say, 30 days-within which to file the
record and a brief. In all, the proceeding would hopefully take no longer than
90 days to complete and a court decision could hopefully be obtained within
another 30 days. Appellate review could be rather perfunctory, and the Supreme
Court would intervene only where an incorrect legal standard had been applied
or a gross miscarriage of justice had occurred. A registrant could concededly
interrupt the induction process and delay his induction by a considerable period
through resort to this procedure, and someone would be required to fill his quota
and go in his place. But interruptions occur now where individuals refuse to
report as ordered and are subjected to criminal prosecution (although only about
12 per cent of reported violations of a serious nature actually result in prosecutions at all, because of System procedural errors, unavailability of evidence, etc.a rather alarming statistic indeed) and the conviction rate in such prosecutions
has been rather low. Moreover, a large number of light or suspended sentences
have been and are being handed out by certain judges, further undermining the
impact of prosecution as an effective sanction. Additionally, with the prime age
group now at 19 and with the lottery system and uniform national call in effect,
there would appear to be fewer incentives for registrants to attempt this sort of
preinduction delay than previously.
And, finally, the approach suggested would have the distinct advantage of
avoiding the subjection of the registrant with a genuinely debatable claim to the
burden of having to undergo criminal prosecution in order to test the validity
of his position (or, alternatively, submit to induction and bring a rather unsatisfactory habeas corpus action). Predictions on things like this are always
hazardous, but I doubt that the overall volume of litigation would be much if any
greater if an across-the-board preinduction review course is followed. It is considerably more humane and, coupled with an upgraded administrative decisionmaking process, will result in a system in which all concerned-registrants, courts
and the country generally-will have more confidence. Resolution of the problem in qualitative terms, in short, is probably as, if not more, important than
solving it quantitatively.
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Epilogue
The Administrative Conference's proposals provide the means by which
qualitative reforms may be achieved. Those proposals do not stand as mere outlines on the horizon, applicable to some future large-scale draft situation. The
various discussions presented in this article indicate the extent to which alterations
in the classification and induction procedures would cope with significant changes
in the country's attitudes and needs. Nor should the relative indifference with
which the various Vietnam accords have been received by the public since
January 27 be allowed to encompass draft reform. The Selective Service System
has clearly indicated its intention to continue selection and classification of the
nation's young men, even if induction will not be ordered after the current fiscal
year and the purpose is to have a standby pool of available manpower." Under
the current law, such administrative functioning will be beyond the reach of any
judicial review except in the narrow band of classification cases which can be
litigated under Oestereich, since no induction will be occurring. Should any
large-scale draft ever again be required, the backlog of unreviewed classifications
would only re-create the more painful and inefficient, not to mention unfair, experience of the 1960's. Such a result will disserve the interests of the country and
again undermine the legitimacy of its governmental processes. The "generation
of peace" which is so ardently welcomed should be relieved of that familiar
spectre. Here, if nowhere else, we can put the lessons of the decade of Vietnam
involvement to the purpose of ensuring that we shall do it better the next time
around, should that day come.

94 Indeed, in early March of this year the System again conducted its annual lottery for
those registrants whose dates of birth place them in the prime age group for the next fiscal
year. At that time System officials indicated that those with the first 95 numbers-approximately 500,000 men-would be processed administratively so that a readily available standby
pool of manpower would be available should the draft be resumed. See Washington Post,

Mar. 9, 1973, at 2, col. 7-8.

